By Alex Adum
The proposed constitutional amendment establishing State Police in Nigeria is considerably more sophisticated than previous attempts at decentralizing policing. It incorporates several constitutional safeguards designed to prevent political abuse and ensure professional standards. Nevertheless, a careful examination of federal policing systems in the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, India and Brazil reveals a number of operational weaknesses, institutional risks and potential avenues for abuse that deserve serious consideration.
The most significant concern is the potential for political capture of State Police by Governors.
Under the proposed framework, Governors appoint Commissioners of Police upon the recommendation of the National Police Council and confirmation by the State House of Assembly. Governors are also empowered to issue directives on matters relating to public safety and public order. Furthermore, State Police personnel will depend substantially on State Governments for funding, logistics, welfare and career progression.
In practical terms, a Governor who controls the State House of Assembly, the State Police budget and the dominant political structures within the State may effectively control the State Police itself.
The consequences could include the harassment of opposition politicians, disruption of opposition rallies, selective arrests, electoral manipulation, and intimidation of journalists and civil society organisations.
These concerns are not merely speculative. Similar abuses have historically been associated with State Electoral Commissions, Local Government structures and State-owned media institutions.
While Governors in the United States also exercise considerable influence over state law enforcement agencies, such powers are moderated by strong and independent courts, powerful federal civil rights enforcement mechanisms, elected sheriffs, independent prosecutors, strong local governments and a highly developed litigation culture. Unfortunately, many of these institutional safeguards remain weak in Nigeria.
Many Nigerian States are dominated by particular ethnic, religious or political groups. There is therefore a genuine risk that State Police institutions may gradually become ethnically, religiously or politically homogeneous.
Such perceptions could prove particularly damaging in States with histories of farmer-herder conflicts, inter-ethnic tensions, chieftaincy disputes and settler-indigene disagreements.
In States such as Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, Taraba, Nasarawa, Rivers and Gombe, a State Police force could easily be perceived as the police force of the dominant ethnic group rather than a neutral law enforcement institution. Such perceptions, whether justified or not, would undermine public confidence and weaken the legitimacy of policing.
The financial sustainability of State Police may ultimately become the greatest operational challenge.
More than twenty-five States currently struggle to meet basic obligations such as salary payments, pension liabilities and infrastructure maintenance. Effective policing is an expensive undertaking requiring training academies, armories, forensic laboratories, intelligence systems, communication infrastructure, patrol vehicles, insurance schemes, barracks and continuous recruitment.
Many States may establish State Police institutions but subsequently lack the resources necessary to maintain professional standards.
The likely consequences include poorly paid officers, widespread corruption, extortion and increased dependence on informal vigilante structures.
Even in the United States, many local police departments struggle with chronic underfunding. Nigeria’s fiscal realities are considerably more challenging.
One of the major strengths of a centralized police system is unified intelligence gathering and coordination.
The creation of thirty-six State Police organisations introduces the possibility of intelligence silos, information hoarding, bureaucratic rivalry and delayed responses to threats that transcend State boundaries.
Kidnapping syndicates, terrorist organisations, arms traffickers and cybercriminal networks do not respect State borders. Their effective disruption requires seamless intelligence sharing and coordinated operations.
Even within the highly developed American system, coordination challenges frequently arise among the FBI, State Police, County Sheriffs and Municipal Police Departments. Nigeria could face even greater difficulties.
The amendment creates overlapping spheres of responsibility between the Federal Police and State Police.
Questions will inevitably arise regarding which institution investigates kidnapping, electoral violence, organised crime, terrorism-related offences and crimes involving both Federal and State interests.
Without clear jurisdictional rules, competing investigations and institutional conflicts may become common.
The amendment authorises Federal intervention where law and order have broken down, where a State Police service is unable to function, or where assistance is requested by the Governor.
However, critical phrases such as “breakdown of law and order”, “serious threat” and “unable to function” remain undefined.
Future Federal Governments may interpret these provisions broadly, thereby creating opportunities for political misuse. Consequently, while some fear abuse by State Police, others fear excessive Federal intervention. The amendment does not completely resolve either concern.
The proposal grants substantial recruitment authority to State Police Service Commissions.
Without constitutionally guaranteed safeguards, recruitment may become influenced by patronage networks, partisan interests, ethnic considerations or family connections.
The experience of India is instructive. State Police services there frequently face allegations of political patronage in recruitment, promotion and deployment. Nigeria may encounter similar challenges.
The proposed National Police Council includes a broad range of stakeholders, including State Attorneys-General, labour representatives, the Nigerian Bar Association, the Nigerian Union of Journalists, the National Human Rights Commission, traditional rulers and retired police officers.
While such inclusiveness is commendable, it may also produce bureaucratic delays, political bargaining and slow decision-making, particularly during emergencies requiring swift action.
The amendment is likely to generate significant constitutional litigation.
Courts may be called upon repeatedly to determine disputes concerning Federal and State jurisdiction, the legality of Federal interventions, removal of Commissioners of Police, operational control issues and funding arrangements.
The Supreme Court may ultimately become the primary arbiter of Federal-State policing disputes.
States such as Lagos, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Ogun, Kano and Kaduna may possess the resources necessary to build sophisticated and highly professional police services.
Poorer States may struggle to do the same.
The result may be a two-tier policing system characterised by first-class policing in wealthier States and significantly weaker policing in poorer jurisdictions. Criminal organisations may naturally gravitate toward areas where law enforcement capacity is weakest.
The United States already exhibits substantial disparities between highly resourced agencies such as the New York State Police and the California Highway Patrol and many smaller rural departments. Nigeria’s economic disparities are even more pronounced.
Nigeria’s First Republic offers an important historical lesson.
Regional police forces were frequently accused of functioning as instruments of ruling parties, tools of political repression and enforcers of electoral manipulation. Many scholars consider these abuses among the factors that contributed to the political instability preceding the military intervention of 1966.
Although the safeguards contained in the current proposal are stronger than those that existed during the First Republic, the underlying risk remains.
What the Proposal Gets Right In My Opinion
To its credit, the amendment introduces several safeguards absent from previous State Police proposals: These include National minimum standards, Certification requirements before operational commencement, Oversight by the National Police Council, Federal grants and financial support, Security of tenure for Commissioners of Police, Two-thirds legislative approval for removal, Restrictions on routine Federal interference, Professional appointment procedures, and Constitutional recognition of both Federal and State policing structures. These represent significant improvements.
The proposed amendment would likely strengthen local intelligence gathering, community policing and rapid response to crime. However, its success will depend less on constitutional drafting and more on the strength of supporting institutions.
My overall assessment is that the proposal is a substantial improvement over the current centralized policing model. However, three conditions are indispensable to its success:
Financial viability and sustainability of the States.
Independence and courage of the judiciary.
Effective insulation of State Police institutions from Governors and ruling political parties.
Without these safeguards, some State Police services may evolve into sophisticated instruments of political enforcement rather than professional law enforcement agencies.
If, however, these concerns are adequately addressed, Nigeria could develop a policing model comparable to those operating successfully in Canada, Australia and Germany, where subnational police institutions function effectively within a federal constitutional framework while remaining accountable to democratic norms and the rule of law.
Alex Ter Adum, PhD, former Attornety General and Commissioner for justice in Benue state writes from alexadum45@gmail.com